Mbabane Gets A Fortress Embassy

FYI, cars will not be allowed to park up against the real NEC Mbabane

My good friends in the Bureau of Overseas Office Buildings (OBO) have cut the ribbon on yet another Fortress Embassy, this one in Mbabane, Swaziland.

From the press release:

The new $141 million campus is situated on an 8.9-acre site in the Ezulwini Valley. Sustainable features to conserve resources and reduce operating costs include a photovoltaic system, light-emitting diode (LED) site lighting, water-conserving plumbing fixtures, on-site wastewater treatment, and drought-tolerant landscaping.

-- snip --

Since 1999, as part of the Department’s Capital Security Construction Program, the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations has completed 131 new diplomatic facilities and has an additional 53 projects in design or under construction.

See the press kit for more project details.

Two things stand out about this short-and-sweet press release. First, the price for this new embassy complex is not especially high (as U.S. embassy construction projects go). Second, there is absolutely no happy-talk about Design Excellence, or Openness, or Innovation, or any quotes from an architect with round eyeglasses and a bow tie.

No, this one was more of a Standard Embassy Design job. Yet another serviceable and sensibly priced office complex churned out for OBO by B.L. Harbert International Group. Browsing the thumbnail photos of their leadership team, I find no one who looks anything like a modern Le Corbusier. I am comfortable with that.

One last thought: so OBO has now completed 131 new U.S. diplomatic facilities under the Capital Security Construction Program? That's roughly half the total number of our embassies and consulates. How much longer will Congress keep the money flowing?

Shall We Place Overseas Buildings Operations Under a Security Boss?

I like the idea - don't get me wrong - but I wouldn't bet money on it being implemented. Like oil and water, OBO and DS don't mix.

Of course, there is always the chance that the next House Oversight Committee hearing on Design Excellence will blow up so badly that a hostile takeover of OBO starts to look good to the big players in that headquarters building across the river from Rosslyn. Be still, my beating heart!

Here's the unofficial restructuring proposal that has me all a-twitter.

Time for Change: Restructuring the State Department for the 21st Century:

WhirledView author Patricia Kushlis has written extensively on the corruption and incompetence that plague State's personnel system. She has also described in depth the longstanding absence of both internal and external oversight. However, there is another problem that must be addressed: the antiquated, bloated and irrational structure of management operations at State. In this article I map out a new management structure that would address these and other problems.

Because the M portfolio is too large and too diverse to be managed as one entity by one person, it should be broken up and reconfigured into more logical sub-elements. The existing Under Secretary for Management title and portfolio would be eliminated and four new Under Secretaries created – each overseeing a portfolio of related functions in which he/she would have expertise. These four Under Secretaries would report to the Deputy Secretary for Management.

--snip --

Create an Under Secretary for Security Affairs

This portfolio would group together Diplomatic Security, Information Resources Management and Overseas Buildings Operations.

In years gone by, the State Department's security concerns rested largely with threats to personnel and facilities overseas. However, in today's world, the globalization of terror and the growing ability of enemies of the United States to hack our most secure computers present new threats.

In the face of these broader challenges, it only makes sense to group together the safety of personnel and facilities, embassy construction (which is heavily dependent on security standards) and the protection of classified and unclassified information into one bureaucratic domain. The cross-cutting use of security procedures and standards, threat assessments and other intelligence for these three functions would bring greater effectiveness.

Of course the M portfolio is too large and diverse to be managed by one person. Nevertheless, it is, and it has been for a very long time. I wish the best of luck to anyone who tries to break Patrick Kennedy's iron rice bowl into four pieces. Bring Kryptonite.

Fun fact from the past: State Department information programs were placed under the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security in 1989, and the unhappy marriage lasted until 1992. So the idea of merging information programs with overseas buildings and security isn't altogether new and untried.

According to this publicly available source of information, Sheldon J. Krys, Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security from 1989-1992, brought the Office of Information Management (IM) into his portfolio for all the right reasons. However, the merger did not last after his departure.

The Reagan White House also issued NSDD-211, which placed the Department of State in charge of the Diplomatic Telecommunications Service (DTS), which was largely managed by the Office of Communications but worked closely with DS to maintain its security.

Then, in 1989, in an effort to improve information security and better coordination of information, the Department, through the efforts of Assistant Secretary Krys, transferred IM to DS. The IM transfer incorporated OC’s Office of Security (OC/S) and all of OC’s electronic and technical countermeasures into DS. Also, OC’s Field Inspection Teams went to DS, as did the Shield Enclosure program for post communications centers.

The merger of IM and DS proved unpopular and difficult, and the rapid pace of innovation in computer technologies aggravated the situation. Several officials in OC and IM did not like the transfer. One OC/S veteran, Robert Surprise, who was studying at the National Defense University in 1990, devoted his research paper to a reassessment of IM’s transfer to DS. Surprise concluded that the merger did not achieve its intended goals, and that “user and IM communities have expressed dissatisfaction with the new structure” because it was “too bureaucratic, unresponsive, and a hindrance to progress.” The Office of the Inspector General used Surprise’s paper to argue that IM should be removed from DS and put back into the Bureau of Administration. Krys, who had favored the initial transfer, concluded after just two years, that IM should be its own bureau (at least theoretically). After three years, Department officials approved IM’s move back to the Bureau of Administration. While most information management and communications offices left, the security-oriented offices like Computer Security remained with DS.

Okay, so the merger of DS with the Geek Squad didn't work. Geeks with guns? But, that doesn't mean it shouldn't be tried again with DS and Overseas Buildings Operations. Please. Oh, please.

OBO Uploads Video Presentation of The Fortress Embassies of 2014

The video's actual title is "OBO Year In Review." However, it includes the next two, three, or even four years of new embassy construction projects in preview, as well. 

Here's one of those previews, a pastel watercolor artist's rendering of what the new chancery office building in Islamabad should look like when it's done, which ought to be a few years from now.

Who could disagree with such Art, such architectural excellence? Maybe Representative Jason Chaffetz does, but not me.

Standing By

I poked my nose into the OBO front office today, and did not see any cardboard boxes or packing tape lying around. Could be the rumors were wrong, or could be I was a day or two early.

House Oversight Hearing On Embassy Construction Gets No Cooperation

For your use and enjoyment, here is yesterday's House Oversight Committee hearing on new embassy construction. Part 1 of 3, anyway. More to come, as they are posted on the Committee's website.

Check out Chairman Issa's angry opening statement. At the 9:45 minute mark he delivers a warning, not to the witnesses, but rather to "people who are listening today, in Washington today, at the State Department, [who] understand they have stonewalled our requests" for disclosure of documents concerning embassy design and construction. He further accuses those unnamed persons of disguising documents to delay responses, in contempt of Congress's oversight role. "This Committee is reaching the end of its road with State Department stalling."

Oh yeah, there is more to come on this issue.

That Hearing Did Not Go At All Well

While not agreeing with most of this histrionic opening statement, I must say that the Overseas Buildings Operations witnesses did themselves no good at the House Oversight Committee hearing on new embassy construction today.

If this was indeed "the beginning of a series of hearings" on OBO's Design Excellence initiative, as Rep. Chaffetz promised, and if the rest of them go anything like today's hearing did, then I wouldn't be surprised to find this guy back in charge of OBO one day.

There were no real defenders of OBO on either side of the Committee. In fact, it was the ranking Democratic member, Rep. Cummings, who made perhaps the most damning remark of the entire 3 hour-long session. When former Undersecretary for Management Grant Green said that, unless and until OBO produces facts and figures to substantiate its claims, it will not overcome skepticism that increased effort on architectural design won't result in buildings that cost more and take longer to complete, Cummings replied (according to my memory) "Mr. Grant, when I listen to you, you make sense."

If I were OBO's Director, I would be more worried about that remark than about all the hostile questioning she got from Rep. Chaffetz. 

U.S. Embassy In The Netherlands Will Be Replaced

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The State Department sent out a solicitation for construction of a new U.S. Embassy in The Netherlands today. The synopsis reads:

THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE (DOS), Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) is requesting submissions to pre-qualify firms for Construction services for the construction of a New Embassy Compound (NEC). This project will be executed under OBO's Design Excellence Program [program details here]. The project will consist of the construction of a compound to house U.S. Diplomatic functions at [The Hague, The Netherlands].

The solicitation estimates the construction cost to be between $170 million and $210 million. That  estimate is for construction costs alone, since the design is already completed. Pricey, but then, this will be an Excellent Embassy, and you don't find them in a discount bin.

To put the cost in context, it is less than half as much money as our new Ambassador-nominee to The Netherlands personally raised for President Obama's reelection campaign.

The current embassy office building was designed by the noted Modernist architect Marcel Breuer, which makes it a property of cultural significance. What will be done with that building once the new embassy is up?

The Dutch authorities, and appreciators of Modernism, have a few ideas about that:

In the area of historic preservation, the solitary Modern Movement building has always posed a problem for our field. An “oddity”, debate surrounds a perceived mismatch between Modern Architecture and their historical surroundings of ornamented 18th-19th century architecture. This is also the case with the American Embassy in The Hague, the Netherlands. The embassy was designed by Marcel Breuer from 1957-1959. Since the Gulf War, and especially after 9/11, the embassy became a defensive, "attack proof" building, heavily guarded by high fences and permanent police protections. It is expected that in the near future, the American embassy will leave Breuer's building and move to a new, more easily protected location.

These recent developments have stirred up several public debates about the embassy’s future. Some have argued for demolition, a sentiment that seems to be dictated by the current inaccessible character of the embassy. Others have opted for preservation, ranging from restoring it to its original state, to reuse in an adapted form. At the moment, current public opinion supports the preservation of Breuer’s building as an opportunity to celebrate this icon and research its possibilities for transformation. The Alderman for Culture of The Hague holds a corresponding view, and has announced a desire to investigate the possibility of conversion into a design hotel and museum for the 2018 event entitled: The Hague - Cultural Capital of Europe. It seems that even an iconic MoMo building like Breuer’s American Embassy at The Hague will have to face the 10th International Docomomo Conference mantra: “The Challenge of Change.”

"Docomomo" is an international non-profit organization dedicated to the documentation and conservation of buildings of the modernist movement.

I looked up some photos of the U.S. embassy in The Hague, and they show the progression of physical security measures that have been installed over time. 

Early 1960s

First and foremost, you see how the building sits right on the street. Completely accessible. There is almost zero setback distance between the building and those great 60s cars that are parked just a few feet away. Carbombs were not a concern back then, obviously.

Security aside, I rather like the design. Modernism wasn't decorative, and many people find the buildings ugly. But still, those are some clever window details. It reminds me of the many 1930s and 40s office buildings you see in Washington, and that seems an appropriate look for a U.S. embassy.    

Around 1980, I would guess

A wire fence and some low parking bollards - those little black metal posts - were added to the sidewalk in front of the embassy at some point after the 1960s. That provided a little bit of access control, probably by channeling visitors to a screening point.

Current Conditions

In the current photos the wire fence has been replaced by a taller metal picket fence that would be harder for a mob to push down or climb over, and the bollards seem to have been replaced with stronger (higher, larger diameter, and more closely spaced) ones.

Current Conditions

 












The perimeter has also been supplemented with an elevated guard booth.

But the booth doesn't really matter, and neither do the fence and bollards. Given the fundamental lack of setback distance, there is nothing the USG could ever do with that building to make it reasonably well-protected against terrorism.  

The new embassy will be in a more remote location where it can be much better protected. But, what will it look like?

Here's an artist's rendering, which I found in a publicly available Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations briefing to industry.

New Embassy Project, artist's rendering

We gain in security, I'm sure, but we lose something in character.

Except for the Great Seal, that looks like any of a thousand community colleges. Or the FSI campus, if enough geese collect around that pond.

Fortress Embassies, Yet Again

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If you ask me, the Fortress Embassy trope has been explored ad nauseum for over twenty years. Nevertheless, it seems to have become a matter of great interest to official Washington once again. So, once again, I am moved to discuss inside baseball stuff like setback distances and fenestration limits. Please read no further unless you are tremendously excited by such things.

Last September, as he was departing from Warsaw, Ambassador Victor Ashe made some remarks about diplomatic architecture and security in which he recycled old arguments that others have made before and better. I thought Ambassador Ashe was partly misguided, and I made some comments about why.

Now, the Council of American Ambassadors has put Ashe's old remarks into its current (Spring 2010) publication. Since they are recycling old complaints, I'll recycle some of the my old reactions.

All the kvetching by former Ambassador Ashe and others comes down to a few core points. Here's what they are and why I think they are mistaken, in whole or in part:

Chronic Complaint #1 - These onerous embassy security requirements are something new. As Ashe says, "After the tragic bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania followed by the attack on the World Trade Center, new security requirements were imposed on embassy and consulate constructions. Diplomatic security became involved in the design process." Actually, the physical security standards for new overseas diplomatic facilities have changed hardly at all since they were first established in 1986, and Diplomatic Security is no more or less involved in design matters today than it was then. Only one thing changed after the attacks on our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and that was the new willingness of Congress to provide a steady stream of multi year funding for new embassy construction.

Chronic Complaint #2 - Setback distance, the most prominent attribute of Fortress Embassies. "The requirement of a 100 foot setback on all four sides of an embassy makes it impossible in many cases to build an embassy in the central part of most capital cities" and causes new embassies to be located in remote and inaccessible places, as happened with U.S. Embassy Zagreb. Actually, a 100-foot requirement is not so great that it alone could drive new embassy locations to remote sites. Even the huge building that will be needed to house the new U.S. Embassy in London will get all the required setback from a plot of only 5 acres, and a plot of that size certainly could have been found reasonably near Zagreb's city center. The real culprit here is the Standard Embassy Design (SED), since it requires a lot of room, usually in a rectangular plot of 10 to 15 acres, to house an entire consolidated embassy space plan consisting of offices, COM and MSGQ residences, warehouses, shops, utility buildings, and sometimes recreation facilities. The 100-foot setback standard contributes to the site selection problem, but is only a minor factor. There is no security standard that calls for new embassy sites to be of any minimum size or to be located in remote areas, as anyone with access to 12 FAH-6 can verify for himself.

Chronic Complaint #3 - New embassies are designed without regard for local security conditions. "[S]ome countries, due to a high-risk threat, require these fortress-like facilities (regrettable but true). But this is not the case in every nation ... the law needs to be changed to allow flexibility by the State Department to construct embassies consistent with the security threat in a given nation." The reality of transnational terrorism is that all nations have some threats in common, particularly the threat of large vehicle-borne bombs, and therefore certain security measures must be applied equally to every new embassy. To do otherwise would create soft targets for groups like al Qaeda to exploit. I believe that was the lesson we learned by the East Africa embassy bombings, which occurred at purportedly low threat posts.

Chronic Complaint #4 - Fortress Embassies are unfriendly. "The approach of emphasizing security over design also causes American personnel difficulty in interacting with citizens of the host nation. Citizens do not enjoy coming to the embassy where they are searched numerous times and must cross the concrete barriers which surround the embassy." We are often told that foreign clients who wish to visit U.S. embassies are deterred by the hassle and perceived insult of having to be screened and searched. I believe it; everybody hates being screened and searched. But I do not see the alternative, especially not when body-borne explosives are an established tactic that has been used by terrorists who wish to attack U.S. targets. Shall we have less entry control for U.S. embassies than we do for U.S. airlines? I have yet to hear anyone even attempt to make the case that we should.

Chronic Complaint #5 - All those Fortress Embassies look like prisons. "These embassy designs invariably connote a fortress (or even a prison) with narrow windows. Often, these buildings are just plain ugly and stick out like sore thumbs." It is often said that there is some security standard that requires new embassies to have small or narrow windows. That was true once upon a time, back in the dim mists of history, during the first year or two of the Inman program. Back then, it was impossible to obtain windows that could stay intact under large bomb blasts, so in order to minimize harm to the people inside new embassies the State Department limited fenestration - principally windows - to 15% of the building's facade. The limit was quickly raised to 30%, and I believe even that wasn't followed in every Inman building. When Congress started funding new embassies again after the East Africa bombings, there was no longer any need to limit fenestration and no such security standard or criteria exists. In fact, there seems to be nothing but windows in this new embassy that was completed in 2008. As for new embassies often being ugly, I suppose that is in the eye of the beholder, so see for yourself at this publicly available source of information which has photos of completed projects.

None of these complaints will be dispelled any time soon, I know. They will be rehashed over and over again as OBO develops its design excellence program and the accompanying strategic plan.

The phrase "déjà vu" refers to something "already seen." I need another French phrase for the topic of Fortress Embassies, something that means "I've seen it before and I know I'm going to see it again, and again." Until the French come up with that one I shall just say, "plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose."

That's Not a Wall, It's a Park

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The U.S. State Department has announced that an exhibit on the new London Embassy design officially opened today at the headquarters of the American Institute of Architects in Washington, D.C.

Stephen Kieran and James Timberlake [the project architects] will lead a discussion on the winning scheme at 6:30 pm tonight at the American Institute of Architects. Following the lecture and discussion, the exhibit will be open until 9:00 pm.

The exhibit is open to the public weekdays through June 30th from 9:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., weekdays at the American Institute of Architects located 1735 New York Avenue NW, Washington, D.C. Admission is free.

There is more information at the American Institute of Architects (AIA) website.

The embassy is essentially a cube covered in high-tech ETFE plastic that sits on a circular plaza, separating different security planes with landscaping. The embassy is across the Thames, in an area called Nine Elms, a former industrial district that’s been highlighted for redevelopment. One half of the circular site is bisected by a reflecting pool, and the other contains meadows of native American plant species, terraced on several levels to limit pedestrian and vehicular access. The security checkpoint is disguised with a green roof, and all the required setbacks and blast-resistant structural members are in order.

Here's the exhibit, lecture, and discussion in a nutshell. Or rather, in a puzzle:

Boil all this down, and the irreducible design question is one of subterfuge and artful presentation: “When is a wall not a wall?” KieranTimberlake’s answer is, “When it’s a park.”

I like the idea. There is, in fact, a perimeter wall in the London embassy design and it does, in fact, prevent uninspected vehicles from approaching closer than 30 meters as required by State Department security standards and U.S. law. If that perimeter barrier is a circular nested wall and a water feature rather than something overwhelmingly obvious, then so much the better.

Here's more:

Evidence of this fact [that embassies are "bound in symbolic communication"] is apparent in the transition from the State Department’s previous Standard Embassy Design (SED) program to its new commitment to build embassies through a GSA-inspired Design Excellence program. The SED program began as a response to the 1998 terrorist bombings of U.S. embassies in East Africa, and was meant to raise the level of security at diplomatic facilities. It succeeded at this goal, but the products of the SED program were often isolated, fortress-like compounds on exurban sites designed with static templates that didn’t reflect the context of their environment. With the help of an AIA report on embassy design issued last year, the State Department has pledged to find ways to balance the need for security and quality design in each of its projects.

I'm sure the Office of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) will be pleased to learn that it has transitioned from its "previous" Standard Embassy Design program. Actually, I think that program continues, but I can't blame the AIA for trying to abolish it.

Fortress Embassies Under Seige

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Way back in July, I posted about an initiative by the architectural community, in and out of the U.S. State Department, to roll back some of the security requirements and management strictures that apply to new embassy design:

The American Institute of Architects (AIA) has released a report on the distressingly low state of contemporary U.S. diplomatic design, a report done for the State Department's Office of Overseas Building Operations (OBO). It calls upon the Guardians of High Culture to fight back against the Troglodytes of Government Security, those lowbrow types who supposedly gained the upper hand over Art and Beauty after the 1983 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Beirut and Kuwait and haven't given it up since.

Although a lowbrow type myself, I look forward to a clash over this stuff since I think the AIA makes many good recommendations ... So let the clash begin! Bring it on, you architects!

Well, it took them ten whole months to bring it, but at long last the clash has begun.

The opening shot was fired today by Senator John Kerry, whose office sent out a press release with this mouthful of a title: To Improve Security And Enhance Environmental Sustainability, Chairman Kerry Introduces Legislation To Advance U.S. Embassy And Consulate Design. It's about a bill he has introduced, the Embassy Design and Security Act (S.2971), which would create a 'design excellence program' at the State Department and take other steps to free the Guardians of High Culture from the handcuffs that were clapped on them years ago by the Troglodytes of Government Security.

Kerry, joined by former Senator William Cohen, also wrote a brief article for CNN about his bill. These quotes from Concrete bunker U.S. embassies send wrong message will give you the idea:

The design of America's embassies overseas might seem at best a mere question of bricks and mortar or a relatively arcane issue in a time of big challenges.

But as we wage a global battle for hearts and minds, embassies can send a powerful message to people everywhere about what America stands for. As the first impression many foreign people have of the United States, embassies can be another force in our arsenal to convey who we really are, to bring allies closer to us, and, yes, even to make us safer.

Unfortunately, many of our embassies are not sending the right message. Our diplomats are engaged in heroic and difficult work every day. But too often, their buildings -- cold concrete at a forbidding distance, hidden away from city life, with little regard for the local surroundings -- undermine our diplomats' message and even their mission.

-- snip --

Let us be clear: Our diplomats risk their lives daily. Their security will always come first.

TSB Note: Whenever I see the words "security will always come first" they are invariably followed by the word "but".

But because diplomats are already taking such risks, we want to empower them to achieve their mission. If the job of diplomats is to reach out to people, promote U.S. values, obtain and share information, and help advance our diplomatic agenda, then we have to build embassies that neither compromise our diplomats' safety nor their work.

Kerry's bill, and in fact the whole 'Excellence in Design' business, is not supported by everyone in the Office of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO), and neither is is opposed by everyone in OBO's counterpart organization within Diplomatic Security. I'll have more comments on this topic in the next few days.